With Invasion of Ukraine, Security Council’s Efforts to Maintain International Peace, Stability Mired by Widening Rifts Between Veto-Wielding Members

Despite Organ’s Stalled Action on Non-Proliferation Threats, Protracted Conflicts, Progress in Colombia Shows Peace, Reconciliation Possible

As the Security Council fully resumed in-person meetings, the invasion of Ukraine at the start of the year by the Russian Federation – a permanent, veto-wielding member of the Council – plunged the 15-nation organ into a fractious new normal, widening pre-existing rifts, making consensus more laborious than ever to achieve and impeding efforts to fulfil their responsibility in maintaining international peace and security.

The Council convened a total of 276 public meetings – up from 246 in 2021 – 46 of which were devoted to the situation in Ukraine. The proliferation of meetings was accompanied by fewer adopted resolutions: 54 in 2022, down from 57 in 2021 and 2020. As many as 18 of these adoptions – a third – were non-unanimous, compared to less than a sixth in 2021, a reflection of the Council’s internal dissension. Similarly, the elusiveness of unanimity led to its adopting considerably fewer presidential declarations, only 7, compared to 24 in 2021. However, the number of press statements issued rose to 67, from 60 in 2021.

The use of the veto also rose from once in 2021 to four times in 2022, wielded each time by the Russian Federation, twice on matters relating to Ukraine. That country’s veto on 25 February, in response to a resolution intended to bring its offensive against its neighbour to a halt, prompted the Council to refer that situation to the General Assembly, the first time it was doing so in 40 years. The constraints placed on the Council’s capacity to act prompted ever more vociferous calls for its reform. Newfound urgency around the use of the veto also prompted a brand-new precedent: In April, the General Assembly decided that it would meet automatically within 10 days of the use of the veto at the Council by one of that organ’s five permanent members.

Early in the year, Secretary-General António Guterres appeared before the Council to sound the alarm about urban warfare, which impacted 50 million people around the world, warning that civilians accounted for 90 per cent of those affected by the use of explosive weapons in urban spaces. That concern foreshadowed the fallout of the Ukraine war and the devastating human cost it would extract, a cost highlighted by many briefers in the course of the year, including the Director at the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, Ramesh Rajasingham, who warned in May that as many as 100 million civilians were fleeing such conflicts for the first time on record.

Throughout the year, the Council addressed issues related to women, peace and security, hearing from a range of briefers who underlined the need to increase women’s representation in peace processes, redress setbacks to gender equality resulting from the pandemic and address conflict-related sexual violence. That particular issue was the focus of an open debate in April, with Pramila Patten, Special Representative for Sexual Violence in Conflict, questioning what the Council’s resolutions on women, peace and security meant for women in Ukraine, Afghanistan, Myanmar and Ethiopia, as verified cases of sexual violence increased across the globe. The Council also heard from Nadia Murad, Nobel Peace Prize Winner and United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) Goodwill Ambassador, who called for action and accountability, rather than moral outrage, and for Governments to support victims, who were too often left to pick up the pieces of their lives alone.

Despite the prevailing atmosphere of dissension, there were a number of issues upon which Council members agreed, including the need to improve the safety, security and well-being of its more than 80,000 peacekeepers, the majority of whom are deployed to the world’s most complex conflict environments. In July, during a ministerial-level open debate, Secretary-General Guterres warned of the potential deadliness of disinformation, and its ability to change “our blue flag from a symbol of security into a target for attack”. The Council then adopted a presidential statement emphasizing the need to improve strategic communications across peacekeeping operations’ civilian, military and police components. In December, the Council also unanimously adopted resolution 2668 (2022), recognizing the need to raise awareness of the importance of mental health and psychosocial support to United Nations peace operations personnel.

The Council also took up the topic of sanctions and their unintended consequences after a five-year spell. In February, Martin Griffiths, Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator, spotlighted the humanitarian carve-out in Afghanistan – first put in place in December 2021 – as a way to permit humanitarian aid to reach those at greatest risk. In December, consensus on that usually divisive issue was found in the adoption of resolution 2664 (2022) provided a standing humanitarian exemption to asset freeze measures imposed by United Nations sanctions regimes, which Council members also decided would apply for a two-year period to the 1267/1989/2253 ISIL (Da’esh) and Al-Qaida sanctions regime.

Progress was also made in redressing the widespread socioeconomic and vaccine inequity that followed the spread of the COVID-19 pandemic over the past two years. In April, the Council heard from Ted Chaiban, Global Lead Coordinator for COVID-19 Vaccine Country Readiness and Delivery, part of the COVAX Facility, an initiative aimed at effectuating equitable worldwide access to COVID-19 vaccines. He pointed out that, as a result of the partnership’s focus on 34 countries where coverage dwindled below 10 per cent, the first four months of the year saw the number of countries with coverage at or below that rate drop to 18 countries.

In a year when most conflict situations under the Council’s purview deteriorated or stayed in a frozen state, the situation in Colombia proved that peace and reconciliation was possible. Six years after the historic peace accord between the Government and the rebel group Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia-Ejército del Pueblo (FARC-EP), efforts to implement the agreement received a boost in June through the elections of Gustavo Petro as President, and Francia Márquez, the first Afro-Colombian Vice-President in the country’s history. Meeting in July, just ahead of President-elect Petro assuming office, Carlos Ruiz Massieu, Special Representative and Head of the United Nations Verification Mission in Colombia, told the Council of the new Government’s commitment to make peace and the implementation of the agreement a cornerstone of their policy. “There are good reasons for optimism for peace,” he reported.

However, Council divisions came to the fore during emergency meetings addressing the unprecedented flurry of intercontinental-ballistic-missile launches by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. The first of these meetings in March convened following a dozen missile launches by Pyongyang in contravention of several Council resolutions, with one missile landing within Japan’s Exclusive Economic Zone. Rosemary DiCarlo, Under-Secretary-General for Political and Peacebuilding Affairs, called for the Council’s unity, as Japan’s representative decried that organ’s “long-regrettable silence”. In May, the Council attempted to adopt a resolution that would have strengthened sanctions on Pyongyang for its illegal launches. However, that text was thwarted by the Russian Federation and China’s use of the veto, who denounced the measures as counterproductive and inhumane. Several delegates voiced regret over the vote’s outcome, with Japan’s representative, once again, questioning what the Security Council was for if not to act in such cases and calling the reasons of those who voted against the draft “unconvincing”.

The Council’s divisions came into even sharper focus with the war in Ukraine as it addressed that conflict’s fallouts, including, among others, global food supplies and world-wide food shortages, fleeing of millions of refugees to neighbouring countries and the threat posed by the shelling of Zaporizhzhia Power Plant. In February, shortly after the Council met and Secretary-General Guterres urged the Russian Federation not to attack Ukraine, President Vladimir V. Putin announced the start of a “special military operation”. In the months that followed, the Council was briefed extensively on the war’s impact on civilian, as infrastructure was destroyed and casualties mounted. However, amid escalating concerns over the conflict’s consequences on global food security, the Black Sea Grain Initiative was signed in Istanbul in early spring. Designed to facilitate the safe transport of grain and foodstuffs from Ukrainian ports to developing countries at risk of food insecurity, Under-Secretary-General Rosemary DiCarlo told the Council that this “beacon of hope” demonstrated dialogue between the parties was possible.

Nonetheless, United Nations officials returned to the Council time and again to urge an end to the war amidst continuing attacks on hospitals, schools and public services, as well as reports of civilians being arbitrarily detained, tortured and disappeared. Adding to tensions, the Russian Federation, in September, proclaimed annexation of certain Ukrainian regions, and as colder months approached, launched missile and drone strikes against critical energy infrastructure. While many Council members accused Moscow of weaponizing winter, the Russian Federation’s delegate said his country would use all available logistical and military means to protect its interests – one example of the diverging stances that defined the Council’s debates on this issue.

Similar divisions also played out during the Council’s 27 meetings addressing the situation in Syria, with differences cropping up regarding sanctions, the renewal of cross-border authorization for humanitarian aid in the country’s opposition-controlled north-west, the use of chemical weapons and even on the appropriate number of monthly meetings to be held on the country’s humanitarian and political situations. With the conflict entering its twelfth year in March, the Secretary-General’s Special Envoy Geir O. Pedersen cautioned that little progress had been made in reconvening negotiations of the Syrian Constitutional Committee tasked in 2019 to draft a new Constitution. In August, he informed the Council that, although relative calm over the past two years had provided a “window to build a credible political process”, the opportunity had not yet been seized. That calm was shattered in subsequent months, following attacks by fighters from the Council-listed terrorist group Hayat Tahrir al-Sham in Afrin and pro-Government air strikes in the north-west as well as, in November, an upsurge of fighting across northern Syria between the Syrian Democratic Forces and Türkiye and armed opposition groups. Special Envoy Pedersen, noting that the Constitutional Committee had not met in six months, stressed that the absence of a credible political process only promoted further conflict and instability.

Under-Secretary-General Martin Griffiths, also briefing the Council on the dire humanitarian situation – compounded by fuel and water shortages and a spreading cholera outbreak – said that the number of Syrians requiring life-sustaining aid was expected to surpass 15 million in 2023. With the urgent need to renew the authorization keeping the Bab al-Hawa crossing between Syria and Türkiye open for humanitarian aid delivery to 4 million people in the north-west, negotiations were contentious, with the Council rejecting two competing resolutions. The first text, vetoed by the Russian Federation, would have left the border crossing open for 12 months, leading the delegate of the United States to deplore “one member taking the entire Council hostage with lives hanging in the balance”. Following protracted negotiations, the Council adopted resolution 2642 (2022) in July, a compromise text extending the use of the border-crossing for six months, until January 2023.

Although the ceasefire agreement reached in May 2021 between Israel and the Palestinian group Hamas largely held, Tor Wennesland, Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process told the Council that escalating tensions, daily clashes and unchecked settlement activity were dimming hopes for a two-State solution. In August, the killing of a Palestinian teenager during an operation by the Israeli Defense Forces in Jenin refugee camp led to three days of fighting between Israel and Palestinian Islamic Jihad militants, leaving 46 Palestinians dead, including 4 children. Briefing the Council, Special Coordinator Wennesland welcomed efforts by Egypt and others in brokering a truce, pointing out that it helped prevent the outbreak of a full-scale war. In November, regarding attacks by Israeli settlers against Palestinians in Hebron, Mr. Wennesland stressed: “Political leadership is required to reset a trajectory towards a two-State solution.” Nonetheless, the year also witnessed the signing on 13 October of the Algiers Declaration, in which 14 Palestinian factions, including Fatah and Hamas, agreed to recognize the Palestinian Liberation Organization as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people.

Libya entered 2022 mired in turbulence and political uncertainty, due to the postponement of national elections slated for December 2021. Briefing the Council, Under-Secretary-General DiCarlo detailed steps taken to advance the electoral process, including establishing a road map committee to define a timetable and process for elections, which was then actualized in June in a high-level meeting at the United Nations Headquarters in Geneva. Still, consensus was not reached on the eligibility requirements for presidential candidates. In October, the newly appointed Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Libya and Head of United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL), Abdoulaye Bathily, told the Council that the solution must be based on the will of the Libyan people. The Libyan delegate, welcoming “a glimmer of hope” emerging from the Council, urged support for the electoral process. However, in December, Mr. Bathily reported that the situation had deteriorated on all fronts, with leaders failing to finalize a constitutional basis for elections. Nonetheless, progress on accountability for crimes committed in Libya in 2011 was made, with newly appointed International Criminal Court Prosecutor Karim Khan visiting the country in November, marking the first visit of his office since the Council referred the situation to the Court more than a decade ago.

The conflict in Yemen entered its eighth year, with a surge in attacks beyond Yemen’s borders and into the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia by Ansar Allah, also known as the Houthis. By March, Under-Secretary-General Griffiths informed the Council that as many as 23.4 million Yemenis needed assistance, warning that the country was becoming a chronic emergency, marked by hunger, disease and other miseries that were rising faster than aid agencies could reverse. In April, a United Nations-brokered truce between the Government of Yemen and Houthi rebels brought some respite from hostilities, which Hans Grundberg, the Secretary-General’s Special Envoy for Yemen, stressed represented the best opportunity for peace in Yemen in years. However, the agreement was not renewed once it expired in October.

The situation in West Africa and the Sahel also remained complex and volatile, with Ghada Fathi Waly, Executive Director United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), informing the Council that transnational organized crime – facilitated by corruption – was perpetuating instability, violence and poverty. Council members also expressed concern about the withdrawal of Mali from all Group of Five for the Sahel (G5 Sahel) bodies, including the joint force, forcing the subregional organization to shift its headquarters from Bamako, the capital of Mali, to N’Djaména in Chad. However, the region also experienced positive developments, in the form of regional diplomatic efforts towards achieving lasting peace, through the regional Heads of State Conclave held in April in Nairobi, which the Council welcomed through a presidential statement in June.

In March, Bintou Keita, Special Representative of the Secretary-General in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Head of the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) outlined to the Council measures taken to assist operations of the Forces Armées de la République Démocratique du Congo and the Uganda People’s Defence Forces to curb the activities of armed groups, including the 23 March Movement (M23). The Council issued a great many press statements condemning attacks by armed groups against both civilians and peacekeepers in the region, including one in February that killed 58 civilians in a camp for internally displaced persons in Ituri Province in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

Among other developments, the Council devoted several meetings in 2022 to Haiti, which has been gripped by overlapping security, economic and humanitarian crises, as well as a rapidly spreading cholera outbreak, since the assassination in 2021 of President Jovenel Moïse. In October, following the blockade by criminal gangs of the country’s primary fuel source, Prime Minister Ariel Henry appealed to the international community for help. The Council responded soon after by establishing a sanctions regime on Haiti – its first new sanctions regime since 2017 – unanimously adopting resolution 2653 (2022).

In addition, the Council met in December to adopt its first-ever resolution on Myanmar, resolution 2669 (2022), by a vote of 12 in favour to none against, with 3 abstentions (China, India, Russian Federation). By the text, it demanded an immediate end to violence throughout the country and urged restraint and the de‑escalation of tensions. It also urged the Myanmar military to release arbitrarily detained prisoners, including President Win Myint and State Counsellor Aung San Suu Kyi. It also devoted two meetings to the situation in Azerbaijan, following clashes breaking out on the border with Armenia in September.

Following are summaries of public meetings held in 2022:

Europe

Ukraine

Meetings: 31 January, 17 February, 21 February, 23 February. 25 February, 27 February, 28 February, 4 March, 7 March, 11 March, 14 March, 17 March, 18 March, 23 March, 29 March, 5 April, 11 April, 19 April, 5 May, 6 May, 12 May, 13 May, 19 May, 6 June, 21 June, 28 June, 29 July, 11 August, 23 August, 24 August, 6 September, 7 September, 8 September, 22 September, 27 September, 30 September (vote), 30 September (briefing), 21 October, 26 October, 27 October, 31 October, 2 November, 16 November, 23 November, 6 December, 9 December.

Resolutions: 2623; Not adopted: (S/2022/155), (S/2022/231), (S/2022/821); Vetoed: (S/2022/720).

Presidential Statements: S/PRST/2022/3.

With the conflict in Ukraine entering its eighth year, 2022 began with uncertainty in the Council as the decision to hold the year’s first meeting on Ukraine under the agenda item “Threats to international peace and security” was put to a procedural vote. Of the 46 meetings held on Ukraine, 15 were held under this agenda item, 18 were held under “Maintenance of Peace and Security in Ukraine”, 2 were held under “Maintenance of International Peace and Security” and 11 were held upon request by letters by the Permanent Representatives of either the Russian Federation or Ukraine to the President of the Security Council.

Following several months of heightened tensions, the United States requested a meeting on 31 January, under the agenda item “Threats to international peace and security” to discuss the Russian Federation’s military build-up along Ukraine’s borders. While the Russian Federation opposed the meeting – stating that positioning troops within its territory was a domestic matter – 10 Council members supported holding it. The Russian Federation and China cast votes against holding the meeting and Gabon, India and Kenya abstained. Rosemary DiCarlo, Under-Secretary-General for Political and Peacebuilding Affairs then briefed the Council, citing the Russian Federation’s reported deployment of over 100,000 troops and heavy weaponry along border areas, along with the unspecified numbers of Russian troops and weaponry sent to Belarus for joint military drills. She also noted that members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) were reportedly planning additional deployments in the alliance’s Eastern European States, with 8,500 troops on high alert. While the United States’ representative stressed that the Council must not only address conflicts after they occur – but prevent them from happening in the first place – the Russian Federation’s delegate rejected accusations that Moscow intended to attack Ukraine.

On 17 February, following the Russian Federation’s assumption of Council presidency, Under-Secretary-General DiCarlo briefed the 15-nation organ again, underscoring the danger of the current situation and stressing that the Package of Measures for the Implementation of the 2015 Minsk Agreements was the only Council-endorsed framework for a negotiated, peaceful settlement. Mikko Kinnunen, Special Representative for the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) Chairperson-in-Office in Ukraine, cautioned that, while it had become popular to accuse participants of violating those accords, none have fully implemented the agreements’ provisions. Sergey Vershinin, Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, spotlighting the meeting’s goal of reaffirming support for the full implementation of the Minsk agreements, urged the Council to avoid speculation about plans for a Russian Federation invasion. Meanwhile, Ukraine’s representative expressed concern about a recent appeal by one of the chambers of the Russian Federation’s Parliament to recognize the occupied parts of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions of Ukraine as so-called “peoples’ republics”.

Four days later, on the night of 21 February, the Council held an emergency meeting at Ukraine’s request, which followed the Russian Federation’s decree to recognize the independence of certain areas of Ukraine’s Donetsk and Luhansk regions. Under-Secretary-General DiCarlo, sounding alarm over Moscow’s decision to deploy its troops into eastern Ukraine reportedly on a peacekeeping mission, urged that negotiation was the only way to address differences over regional security and the settlement of the conflict in eastern Ukraine. Delegates met again, at Ukraine’s request, in another late-night emergency meeting on 23 February, as United Nations Secretary-General António Guterres cited rumours of an imminent offensive and urged Russian President Vladimir V. Putin to stop Russian Federation troops from attacking Ukraine. Nearly an hour into the meeting, President Putin announced the start of a “special military operation” in eastern Ukraine in a televised speech. The representative of Ukraine, who had called for the emergency meeting, asked the representative of the Russian Federation if he would state on record that Russian troops were not shelling Ukrainian cities. In turn, the Russian Federation’s representative said that the root of the crisis lay in Kyiv’s provocations against Donbas – the region encompassing Donetsk and Luhansk – which prompted the leaders of the two republics to turn to Moscow for military support.

Amid the unfolding crisis, the Security Council met again on 25 February at the request of Ukraine to consider a draft resolution intended to end the Russian Federation’s military offensive against its neighbour. Submitted by Albania and the United States, the draft was supported by 11 members, but vetoed by the Russian Federation, with China, India and the United Arab Emirates abstaining. The draft would also have had the Council decide that Moscow must immediately and unconditionally reverse its 21 February decision regarding the status of certain areas of Ukraine’s Donetsk and Luhansk regions. Following the vote, the Russian Federation’s representative said his delegation voted against the draft because of what was left out of the text – that those who seized power in 2014 shelled the people of Donetsk and Luhansk; that Ukraine did not implement the Minsk agreements; and that neo-Nazis and militias were continuing to kill civilians. The representative of Ukraine, meanwhile, recalled multiple instances where his Russian counterpart denied intent to invade, adding: “Your words have less value than a hole in a New York pretzel.”

On 27 February, the Council, at the request of Ukraine, called an emergency special session of the General Assembly with support from 11 Council members. While the Russian Federation opposed the measure and China, India and the United Arab Emirates abstained, the procedural resolution 2623 (2022) precluded the use of a veto by the permanent members of the Council. Through the text, the Council called the emergency special session – the first since 1982 – taking into account the lack of unanimity among permanent members on 25 February that prevented the organ from exercising its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. The next day, 28 February, Martin Griffiths, Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator, described damage to civilian infrastructure caused by fighting in cities and towns, underscoring that the longer the offensive continued, the greater the cost – especially for civilians, who were bearing the brunt of aggression. Filippo Grandi, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, also said that, unless the conflict was halted immediately, the global community should expect to see up to 4 million refugees in the coming weeks. While Ukraine’s delegate said that the Russian Federation was attacking kindergartens, hospitals, orphanages and mobile aid brigades in his country, the latter State’s delegate said that his country’s special military operation was not impacting civilian infrastructure.

Under the agenda item “Threats to international peace and security”, on 4 March Under-Secretary-General DiCarlo briefed the Council again, following fierce overnight fighting at Ukraine’s largest nuclear power facility. She stressed that developments at the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant were both unacceptable and highly irresponsible. Rafael Mariano Grossi, Director-General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), then told the Council that the Agency was prepared to travel to Ukraine as soon as possible to ensure that the safety and integrity of all nuclear facilities could be observed. Under-Secretary-General Griffiths returned on 7 March to spotlight the shattering of millions of lives, stressing that the reach of humanitarian efforts can only go so far without the committed cooperation of Ukraine and the Russian Federation to ensure civilians are protected and those wishing to escape the violence or deliver critical aid have safe corridors with which to do so. He also voiced a sense of dread over the impact the conflict will have on the wider world, with food prices spiking and supplies uncertain.

At an emergency meeting called by the Russian Federation on 11 March, that country’s delegate said that Moscow discovered during its special military operation that Kyiv undertook an emergency clean-up of the traces of a military biological programme funded by the United States. High Representative for Disarmament Affairs Izumi Nakamitsu told the Council that the United Nations was not aware of any biological weapons programmes, while Under-Secretary-General DiCarlo observed that, as the war grinded on, civilians were bearing the brunt of the fighting.

On 14 March, in its annual meeting on the work of the Organization for Security and Cooperation across Europe, Zbigniew Rau, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Poland, speaking in his capacity as Chairman-in-Office of OSCE, echoed that point, recalling that invading forces attacked civilian targets in an effort to break the will of the Ukrainian population. Responding to comments by some Russian Federation officials regarding his lack of impartiality in the days and weeks since the invasion began, he stressed: “Impartiality ends where blatant violation of international humanitarian law starts.” Meanwhile, the Russian Federation’s delegate expressed regret that United Nations officials have veered away from impartiality on the situation in Ukraine, also stressing that OSCE has a responsibility to embrace the role of an honest broker in its attempts to facilitate dialogue. [This meeting is also summarized under “Cooperation with Regional Organizations”.]

On 17 March, under the agenda item “Threats to international peace and security”, the plight of civilians again took centre stage, as Under-Secretary-General DiCarlo spotlighted the protection to which civilians are entitled under international humanitarian law. She told the Council that, between 24 February and 15 March, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) recorded 1,900 civilian casualties, most of which caused by the use of wide-impact explosive weapons in populated areas. She also reported on the dire situation faced by those in Mariupol, who were unable to safely evacuate amidst a lack of food, water, electricity and medical care. Raouf Mazou, Assistant High Commissioner for Operations in the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), then noted that, in less than three weeks, the number of people fleeing Ukraine into neighbouring countries had risen from 520,000 to over 3.1 million – the fastest-growing refugee crisis in Europe since the Second World War. The next day, 18 March, High Representative Nakamitsu briefed the Council following the Russian Federation’s circulation of new documents alleging the existence of biological-weapons programmes in Ukraine. Reiterating her statement from the previous week, she stressed that the United Nations was not aware of any such programmes.

The Council, at the request of the Russian Federation, met again on 23 March to hold its third vote in a month, failing to adopt a draft resolution demanding civilian protection in Ukraine and calling for unhindered access for humanitarian assistance. Tabled by the Russian Federation, and supported by that country and China, it was defeated as the other 13 members abstained. After the vote, the representative of the Russian Federation said the vote exposed all those for whom politicization of the humanitarian dossier was more important than delivering aid to vulnerable people. Several other delegates, however, denounced the draft as an attempt to hide a brutal campaign of aggression.

At the request of Ukraine, on 29 March, against the backdrop of Russian Federation and Ukrainian delegations meeting for negotiations in Istanbul, Joyce Msuya, Assistant Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Deputy Emergency Relief Coordinator, briefed the Council. She observed that the conflict in Ukraine threatened to exacerbate other crises – such as those in Afghanistan, Yemen and the Horn of Africa – as those countries and regions were already grappling with food insecurity and economic fragility. She added that rising prices for food, fuel and fertilizer were going to hit hard now and in coming seasons. David Beasley, Executive Director of the World Food Programme (WFP), warning that Ukraine had turned from a breadbasket to a breadline, underscored that the global food-chain system must be stabilized. Secretary-General Guterres echoed that point on 5 April, urging the guns be silenced as the Russian Federation offensive resulted in massive displacement; increases in the price of food, energy and fertilizer; disrupted supply chains; and added pressure for many developing countries already on the verge of debt collapse. While Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, speaking via videoconference, challenged Council members to uphold international law, the Russian Federation’s delegate implored him to recognize that Ukraine is only a pawn in the geopolitical game against the Russian Federation.

Under agenda item “Maintenance of peace and security of Ukraine”, on 11 April, Sima Bahous, Executive Director of the United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women (UN-Women), briefed the Council, highlighting increasing reports of sexual violence and human trafficking in Ukraine. While stressing that conflict-related trauma threatened to destroy a generation, she pointed out that women were continuing to lead and serve their communities through these horrors. Saluting the courage of women in Ukraine -including the women who made up 80 per cent of health- and social-care workers, and the women parliamentarians and Ukraine’s Deputy Prime Minister who continued their work as bombs fell all around them – she emphasized that women must be involved in all efforts to negotiate a peaceful solution to the crisis. Manuel Fontaine, Director of Emergencies at the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), then detailed the dire situation faced by Ukrainian children, nearly two thirds of whom had been displaced since the conflict began. On 19 April, Kelly T. Clements, United Nations Deputy High Commissioner for Refugees, juxtaposed the immense scale and speed of displacement in Ukraine with the remarkable acts of humanity shown by many neighbouring States. While humanitarian actors were continuing to deliver aid, she underscored that the Council must do its job, too, and find a way to end the war. [On 26 April, the General Assembly adopted by consensus resolution A/RES/76/262, which calls for the Assembly to meet whenever a veto is cast in the Security Council.]

The Council, continuing under agenda item “Maintenance of peace and security of Ukraine”, met on 5 May. After two convoys saved nearly 500 people in and around the besieged city of Mariupol – with a third under way – Secretary-General Guterres, in his briefing, stressed the need to enable humanitarian access and evacuations from besieged areas. Meanwhile, Ukraine’s representative said that the Council’s inaction continued to create an atmosphere of impunity as Moscow practised missile terrorism, stole grain supplies and attacked farming infrastructure. The Russian Federation’s representative, however, said that Western countries dismissed Moscow’s security concerns, that “Russophobia” prevails in Ukraine and that his country opened corridors for evacuation regularly. On 6 May, in its first united action since the invasion of Ukraine in late February, the Council expressed strong support for the Secretary-General’s efforts to search for a peaceful solution to the war as it adopted a presidential statement to that effect presented by the United States, Council President for May (document S/PRST/2022/3). United Nations officials highlighted the need for such a solution on 12 May, as Omar Abdi, UNICEF’s Deputy Executive Director, detailed the impact of the conflict on schools and education – a lifeline for children in conflict – and Assistant Secretary-General Msuya outlined the devastating effects of the use of landmines and wide-area explosive weapons in populated areas.

The next day, 13 May, the Council met under agenda item “Threats to international peace and security” to consider new information submitted by the Russian Federation alleging the existence of biological-weapons programmes in Ukraine. Thomas Markram, Deputy to the High Representative for Disarmament Affairs, recalled High Representative Nakamitsu’s March briefings on this issue and affirmed that the United Nations continues to be unaware of any such programmes. The Russian Federation’s representative reported that his delegation had accumulated material directly indicating that the United States and Ukraine were carrying out dangerous biological projects in the centre of Eastern Europe and on his country’s western border. Countering, the representative of the United States said that Moscow repeatedly debased the Council through absurd meetings and ludicrous claims.

Under agenda item “Maintenance of international peace and security”, the Council held an open debate on 19 May addressing conflict and food security, as Secretary-General Guterres noted that the Russian Federation’s invasion of its neighbour effectively ended Ukraine’s food exports, with price increases of up to 30 per cent for staple foods threatening people in countries across Africa and the Middle East. WFP Executive Director Beasley returned to the Council, underscoring the need to open Ukraine’s ports for the 36 countries importing more than 50 per cent of their grain from the Odesa region. Qu Dongyu, Director-General of the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), pointing out that Ukraine and the Russian Federation together export 30 per cent of cereals and 67 per cent of the sunflower oil in the world, observed that what happened to one of those countries affected all Member States. [This meeting is also summarized under “Maintenance of international peace and security”.]

As the conflict passed its 100-day mark, the Council met on 6 June under the agenda item, “Maintenance of peace and security of Ukraine”. Pramila Patten, Special Representative on Sexual Violence in Conflict, noted the yawning chasm between the Council’s many resolutions prohibiting the use of sexual violence as a tactic of war and the situation faced by many women around the world. Welcoming a newly signed framework seeking to strengthen cooperation between those working to combat and deter sexual violence in Ukraine and reduce the risk posed by human traffickers, she called for the international community’s steadfast support in this regard.

In an open debate on “Incitement to violence leading to atrocity crimes” held on 21 June, the Council heard from Alice Nderitu, Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide, who called for an end to the war, protection for civilians and accelerated diplomatic efforts to make both possible. Further, she stressed that the Council must do its part by proposing a road map that considered both peace and justice. Liubov Tsybulska of the Centre for Strategic Communication and Information Security, meanwhile, underscored that the Russian Federation wanted to destroy both Ukraine’s people, and in a broader sense, its identity, while Jared Andrew Cohen, CEO of Jigsaw and Adjunct Senior Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, said that Russian Federation propaganda likely dehumanized Ukrainians in the eyes of Russian soldiers – leading to the many war crimes now alleged. Later, the Russian Federation’s representative blamed Ukraine’s propaganda for pushing that country into Nazism, while Ukraine’s delegate warned those present not to be deceived by Moscow’s anti-fascist rhetoric.

Again, meeting under the agenda item “Maintenance of peace and security of Ukraine” on 28 June, the Council heard from Under-Secretary-General DiCarlo who stated that the depravity of the situation in Ukraine had only increased in the 10 weeks since she last briefed the Council. Spotlighting the high price continuing to be paid by civilians in this war, she reported that OHCHR recorded more than 10,000 civilian casualties as of 26 June. President Zelenskyy also addressed the 15-nation organ via videoconference, urging the adoption of a legal definition of “State terrorism” in the wake of the Russian Federation’s attacks on a residential building, kindergarten and shopping mall over the three days preceding the meeting. The Russian Federation’s delegate, however, stressed that his country never carried out any strikes against peaceful civilian targets, whereas Kyiv was deliberately storing weapons next to residential areas.

On 29 July, the Council met following the signing of an agreement in Istanbul on 22 July – also called the Black Sea Grain Initiative – designed to facilitate the safe transport of grain and foodstuffs from the Ukrainian ports of Odesa, Chornomorsk and Yuzhne. Noting that such agreement offers a “beacon of hope”, Under-Secretary-General DiCarlo said that it also demonstrated that dialogue between the parties was possible. Along with the understanding between the Russian Federation and the United Nations regarding global market access for Russian Federation food products and fertilizers, the accord would bridge the global food supply gap and reduce high prices. However, speakers also addressed the missile strike that was carried out on the port of Odesa less than 24 hours after the deal was signed. On that point, the Russian Federation’s representative said his country acted on 23 July to destroy materiel placed in that port, while Ukraine’s delegate – thanking the Secretary-General for his unequivocal condemnation of the attack – said Moscow’s assertion was refuted by extensive footage from the site showing no sign of secondary detonation of missiles allegedly present in Odesa.

Meeting under the agenda item “Threats to international peace and security”, on 11 August the Council addressed concerns over the situation at the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant in a meeting requested by the Russian Federation. IAEA Director-General Grossi, providing an overview of the plant’s shelling on 5 August, underscored that military actions near a large nuclear facility could lead to very serious consequences. He reported that, while the Agency’s preliminary assessment did not indicate an immediate threat to nuclear safety, “this could change at any moment”. The representatives of the Russian Federation and Ukraine then traded accusations regarding responsibility for strikes around the plant amidst resounding calls for IAEA to be allowed to conduct a mission to the plant to address mounting safety concerns. Similar calls were heard at another meeting requested by the Russian Federation on 23 August, as Under-Secretary-General DiCarlo voiced regret over near-daily reports of alarming incidents involving Europe’s largest nuclear plant and recalled the Secretary-General’s appeal for common sense in this regard. Noting that the United Nations had the capacity to support any IAEA mission to the plant from Kyiv – provided that Ukraine and the Russian Federation agreed – she called for the mission’s immediate, secure and unfettered access to the site. In the ensuing debate, the Russian Federation’s delegate said that Ukrainian armed forces were continuing to shell Zaporizhzhia almost daily, while Ukraine’s representative underscored that his country would not risk a nuclear catastrophe on its own territory.

As the conflict entered its sixth month, the Council, under the agenda item “Maintenance of peace and security of Ukraine”, met on 24 August – the thirty-first anniversary of Ukraine’s independence – hearing again from Secretary-General Guterres, who detailed his recent visit to Ukraine. He reported that, due to the Black Sea Grain Initiative, dozens of ships loaded with over 720,000 metric tons of grain and other food products were able to sail in and out of Ukrainian ports. Recalling the powerful images of wheat pouring into the holds of cargo ships and the United Nations flag flying over vessels bound for the Horn of Africa, he also called on all Governments and the private sector to cooperate to bring Russian Federation food and fertilizer to global markets. Under-Secretary-General DiCarlo, in turn, highlighted that 17.7 million people – 40 per cent of Ukraine’s population – required humanitarian assistance and protection, also citing a July estimate by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) that up to 71 million people might have already been pushed into poverty in the three months following the start of the invasion. Stressing how the human and material toll of the war was tragic, colossal and evident – first and foremost for Ukraine and its people – she underscored: “It must end”.

The Council met under the agenda item “Threats to international peace and security” on 6 September, shortly after an IAEA mission assessed conditions at the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant. IAEA Director-General Grossi told the Council that the physical attacks sustained by the facility were simply unacceptable. He called for the removal of military vehicles and equipment from nuclear facilities, for the Plant’s operating staff to be allowed to return to the routine line of authority and for off-site power redundancy to be established. Otherwise, he stressed, a very serious nuclear accident could occur. Similarly, Secretary-General Guterres, in his briefing, underscored that any damage – intentional or not – to the Plant could spell catastrophe, urging that the Plant be neither a target nor platform for military operations and that a demilitarized perimeter be secured around the facility.

The next day, 7 September, the Council shifted its focus to reports of Ukrainian civilians subjected to forced displacement, deportation and “filtration camps”. Under-Secretary-General DiCarlo, emphasizing the disturbing nature of such allegations, called for their investigation with the cooperation of competent authorities. She also stressed that the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and the United Nations Human Rights Monitoring Mission in Ukraine must have unimpeded access to all individuals detained in relation to the ongoing war. Ilze Brands Kehris, Assistant Secretary-General for Human Rights and Head of OHCHR’s New York Office, reported that OHCHR verified that Russian Federation armed forces and affiliated armed groups were subjecting civilians to so-called “filtration” – a system of security checks and personal-data-collection that sometimes involved forced nudity and puts women and girls at risk of sexual abuse. She also noted that OHCHR documented that men and women perceived as having ties to Ukrainian armed forces or State institutions – or as having pro-Ukrainian or anti-Russian Federation views – were being subjected to arbitrary detention, torture, ill-treatment and forced disappearance.

On 8 September, the Council convened for the third time in as many days to discuss the situation in Ukraine, at the request of the Russian Federation. Under agenda item “Threats to international peace and security”, High Representative Nakamitsu, noting that a large-scale influx of weapons to conflict-affected zones was raising many concerns, said information about the transfers of materiel to Ukraine’s defence forces had been widely publicized by the Governments involved. Adding that international law prohibited direct attacks against civilians or civilian infrastructure, she said: “The time to end this suffering is now.” In the ensuing dialogue, Council members offered differing views on the merits of convening the meeting.

Under agenda item “Maintenance of peace and security of Ukraine” on 22 September, the Council heard from Secretary-General Guterres, who said that the Russian Federation’s war in Ukraine showed no signs of abating and expressed concern over nuclear rhetoric. Noting that OHCHR reports on the subject constituted “a catalogue of cruelty”, he stressed that ending impunity for international crimes was fundamental, and in this, that the International Criminal Court played a fundamental role. Karim Khan, the Court’s Prosecutor, then told the Council that the rule of law can serve as an anchor for peace and security in Ukraine and elsewhere. Noting that 43 States parties referred the situation in that country to the Court between 25 February and 2 March, he said that – based on his Office’s work to date – there were reasonable grounds to believe that crimes within the Court’s jurisdiction had been committed in Ukraine. Adding that “justice is not political”, he pledged to work with all States and the United Nations to deliver the same in Ukraine. Subsequently, Sergey V. Lavrov, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, noted that the Court had not reacted to Kyiv’s crimes, and therefore, that his country had no confidence in that body’s work. Dmytro Kuleba, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Ukraine, then warned that, if the international community did not hold leaders accountable for their actions, every evil force in the world was going to follow their lead.

Meeting again under agenda item “Maintenance of peace and security of Ukraine”, on 27 September, Under-Secretary-General DiCarlo briefed the Council that recent, so-called “referenda” conducted by de facto authorities in the Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson and Zaporizhzhia regions of Ukraine were held during active armed conflict, and therefore, could not be called a genuine expression of popular will. “Unilateral actions aimed to provide a veneer of legitimacy to the attempted acquisition by force by one State of another State’s territory, while claiming to represent the will of the people, cannot be regarded as legal under international law,” she stressed. Warning that recent developments point to more death and destruction, she urged Member States to do all they can to end the war and ensure lasting peace.

Following President Putin’s proclamation of Moscow’s annexation of Luhansk, Donetsk, Kherson and Zaporizhzhia, the Council met on 30 September to vote on a resolution that would have condemned the referenda that preceded it. The draft, submitted by Albania and the United States, was supported by 10 members, but vetoed by the Russian Federation, with Brazil, China, Gabon and India abstaining. Emphasizing that the referenda were carried out in full conformity with international law, the Russian Federation’s delegate said that the regions’ residents did not want to return to Ukraine. Ukraine’s representative then described the Council as a broken pillar of the United Nations, stressing: “If the Council cannot act with Russia, it is its duty to act without it”.

On 30 September, in a meeting convened by the Russian Federation under the agenda item “Threats to international peace and security”, to discuss the four leaks in the Nord Stream pipelines between 26 to 29 September, Navid Hanif, Assistant Secretary-General for Economic Development at the Department of Economic and Social Affairs, said the United Nations was not able to verify or confirm any reported details relating to these incidents as site inspections had yet to be done. Nevertheless, damage to the pipelines raised concerns regarding uncertainty in global energy markets and the exacerbation of high price volatility in European markets and around the world, along with the leaks’ potential environmental impact. Attacks on critical civilian infrastructure were unacceptable, he stressed, urging that these incidents not further increase tensions or deepen divisions in an already-tense regional context. Sergey Kupriyanov, Spokesperson for Gazprom, in his account of events surrounding the “absolutely unprecedented” leaks, reported that existing data pointed to physical damage as the cause. Concurring with that assessment, Marc-Antoine Eyl-Mazzega, Director of the Center for Energy and Climate of the French Institute on Foreign Relations, noted that the Nord Stream 1 and 2 corridors were designed with state-of-the-art technology to reduce the risk of any damage from, among others, storms, Second World War non-exploded bombs or sinking ships. The explosions, which did not proceed from an accident, represented yet another episode in the long-lasting geopolitical confrontation between the United States and the Russian Federation on one hand, and between the latter and Europe on the other hand, where energy and pipeline infrastructure had been weaponized, he said. The representatives of the Russian Federation and the United States exchanged barbs in the ensuing discussion, with the former implying the involvement of the United States and NATO, while the latter denied his country’s involvement in the incidents. [This meeting is also summarized under “Threats to International Peace and Security”.]

The Council again heard about the importance of accountability on 21 October, meeting under agenda item “Maintenance of peace and security of Ukraine”, as Under-Secretary-General DiCarlo reported on new allegations of atrocities emerging in areas recently returned to Ukrainian Government control. Also expressing concern over the destruction of critical energy infrastructure, she recalled that international humanitarian law prohibits attacks targeting civilians and civilian infrastructure. Meanwhile, Denise Brown, United Nations Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator in Ukraine, noted that the onset of winter portended even more deaths in the coming months because civilians lacked access to essential services – particularly those who could not be reached in Donetsk, Kherson, Luhansk and Zaporizhzhia. In the ensuing debate, many speakers spotlighted another issue, condemning the alleged transfer of unmanned aerial vehicles from Iran to the Russian Federation in violation of resolution 2231 (2015).

That issue took centre stage on 26 October at a meeting called by the Russian Federation – under agenda item “Maintenance of international peace and security” – following several delegations’ request for an investigation into whether Moscow violated that resolution. Miguel de Serpa Soares, Under-Secretary-General for Legal Affairs and United Nations Legal Counsel, explained Member States’ obligation to respect the exclusively international character of the responsibilities of the Secretary-General and the Organization’s staff. On resolution 2231 (2015), he said that the Secretariat takes note of all information brought to its attention by Member States to ascertain and assess its relevance to the discharge of its mandates. He added that the Secretary-General had not received any request that supplements or modifies the nature and scope of the Security Council Affairs Division’s work in preparing the Secretary-General’s six-monthly reports to the Council. Meanwhile, Iran’s representative said that his country has maintained a position of active neutrality since the beginning of the conflict in Ukraine. [This meeting is also summarized under “Maintenance of international peace and security”.]

The next day, on 27 October, under agenda item “Threats to international peace and security”, Adedeji Ebo, Director and Deputy to the High Representative for Disarmament Affairs, noted that the Russian Federation filed an official complaint under the Biological Weapons Convention regarding allegations of biological-weapons programmes in Ukraine. Reiterating that the United Nations was unaware of any such programmes, he also pointed out that the Organization currently had neither the mandate nor the technical or operational capacity to investigate. Following the Russian Federation’s 29 October decision to temporarily suspend its participation in the Black Sea Grain Initiative due to alleged attacks against its ships, the Council heard from Under-Secretary-General Griffiths on 31 October that the Initiative “is too important to fail”. He emphasized that, while not all of the grain purchased from Ukraine through the Initiative had gone to the world’s neediest countries, all of it had a humanitarian impact by reducing prices and calming market volatility. Regarding the Initiative’s alleged connection to damage to Russian military vessels and infrastructure, he underscored that no military vessels, aircraft or assets were – or had been – involved in support of the Initiative by any party and urged that the supply line be kept open. Rebeca Grynspan, Secretary-General of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), then told the Council that, with grain exports from Ukraine and the Russian Federation rising, the subsequent decline in food prices may have prevented over 100 million people from falling into poverty. Also noting that UNCTAD was focusing on facilitating market access to Russian fertilizer, she urged all parties to resume and extend the Initiative. [The Russian Federation resumed its participation in the Initiative on 2 November.]

Meeting again under agenda item “Threats to international peace and security”, on 2 November the Council failed to adopt a resolution put forward by the Russian Federation that would have established a commission to investigate Moscow’s complaint regarding the activities of biological laboratories in Ukraine. The draft resolution only received support from one other Council member – China – with France, the United States and the United Kingdom voting against it and the 10 remaining members abstaining.

On 16 November – a day after an explosion killed two people in Poland near the Ukrainian border – Under-Secretary-General DiCarlo briefed the Council under the agenda item “Maintenance of peace and security of Ukraine”, stressing that, in the preceding several days, Ukrainians were subjected to some of the most-intense bombardments of the war, now nine months old. She voiced concern about the loss of electricity, hampered humanitarian efforts, allegations of atrocities and a looming food crisis, stressing that the only way to stop the death, destruction and division was to end the war. She further warned that, as long as it continued, “the risks of potentially catastrophic spill-over remain all too real”. Meanwhile, the Russian Federation’s representative said that, if the West had encouraged Ukraine to make peace on realistic terms rather than supplying it with weapons, Moscow would not have had to carry out precision strikes on infrastructure to weaken Kyiv’s military potential. Poland’s representative reported that initial findings suggested that the 15 November event was not a deliberate attack. Nonetheless, he stressed that the Russian Federation was responsible for menacing the world with its war of aggression and spill-over effects.

Hours after the Russian Federation launched a barrage of missile and drone strikes against civilians and critical infrastructure across Ukraine, on 23 November, Under-Secretary-General DiCarlo returned to the Council during an emergency meeting under agenda item “Maintenance of peace and security of Ukraine” to reiterate that such attacks were prohibited under international humanitarian law. Noting that Ukrainian officials stated that there were practically no large thermal or hydroelectric power plants left intact in Ukraine, she expressed concern that the coming winter was going to be catastrophic for millions of Ukrainians who could be without heating, electricity or water amid freezing temperatures. Against that backdrop, she called on the international community to ensure that the most vulnerable people in that country were adequately protected and able to cope with the months ahead. Concerns about winter’s imminent impact on civilians gripped the Council in a meeting on 6 December under the same agenda item. “In Ukraine today, the ability of civilians to survive is under attack,” stressed Under-Secretary-General Griffiths. He noted that, since October, sustained attacks on Ukraine’s energy infrastructure have left millions without heat, electricity and water, adding that Kyiv needs enhanced international support beyond what humanitarians can provide. France’s delegate, like many others, said that Moscow was using winter as a weapon of war. The representative of the Russian Federation said that, if his country’s aims could not be achieved peacefully, it was going to use all available logistical and military means to protect its interests.

Three days later, on 9 December, the Council met under agenda item “Threats to international peace and security” at the Russian Federation’s request to assess the impact of the ongoing influx of weapons into Ukraine on prospects for ending the conflict. That country’s representative said that, without Western assistance, military activities in Ukraine would have ended a long time ago. Ukraine’s delegate, thanking those who have supported his country, said that the liberation of the Kharkiv, Kherson and Luhansk regions demonstrated that all weapons in Ukraine’s possession were serving their intended purpose. High Representative Nakamitsu, also briefing the Council, encouraged all Member States to apply effective arms-control measures. She underscored, however, that the only way to end the suffering and devastation in Ukraine was to end the war.

Bosnia and Herzegovina

Meetings: 11 May, 2 November.

Resolutions: 2658.

Meeting twice over the course of 2022 on the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Council heard on 11 May from High Representative Christian Schmidt that the country remains “traumatized by war”, with re-emerging threats to its constitutional order 26 years after the signing of the General Framework Agreement for Peace – known as the Dayton Accords. Describing the conflict in Ukraine as “a sobering reminder that […] another war on European soil is not an impossibility”, he cautioned that the immediate risk of inflammatory incidents is real. Raising concern over actions embraced by authorities in Republika Srpska that could undermine the constitutional framework, he called on Governments to support Bosnia and Herzegovina’s unity, including through targeted sanctions. The Council met again on 2 November to extend the mandate of the European-led stabilization force – known as EUFOR-Althea – for another year, unanimously adopting resolution 2658 (2022). While many Council members and representatives of concerned States welcomed the extension of EUFOR-Althea’s mandate, speakers raised alarm over the increased use of inflammatory rhetoric aimed at dividing the country, especially before or during the general elections held on 2 October, which were mostly peaceful. Calls were also made for a newly formed Government to put a quick end to the political deadlock and the paralysis of State institutions.

Kosovo

Meetings: 20 April, 18 October.

Although the final results of elections held on 3 April were still pending, the current majority party in Serbia retained a secure public mandate, Caroline Ziadeh, Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Head of the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), told the Council on 20 April. While eligible Kosovar voters’ participation was not secured, more than 19,000 voters from Kosovo cast their votes at special polling stations established in Serbia. Special Representative Ziadeh again briefed the Council again on 18 October amid several escalations in rhetoric between Pristina and Belgrade that had led to tensions on the ground, threatening to impede many of the gains previously achieved through the European Union-facilitated dialogue. Despite temporary relief in the form of diplomatic interventions, she warned against the parties’ willingness to risk dangerous confrontations on the ground.

Cyprus

Meetings: 27 January, 28 July.

Resolutions: 2618, 2646.

The Council met on 27 January to extend the mandate of the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) until 31 July, unanimously adopting resolution 2618 (2022). By the text, members expressed concern over tensions in the Eastern Mediterranean and called on the leaders of the two Cypriot communities and all involved parties to refrain from any actions that might damage the settlement process. They urged engagement by the sides and the relevant involved parties, facilitated by UNFICYP, to develop a proposal for an effective military contact mechanism. Further, members reiterated that no unilateral actions should be taken in Varosha – an abandoned quarter of the seaside town of Famagusta – that are not in line with relevant Security Council resolutions. The Council urged the leaders of both communities to make progress towards achieving a mine-free Cyprus, clearing the 29 remaining suspected hazardous areas on the island.

Meeting again on 28 July, the Council extended the mandate of UNFICYP until 31 January 2023, unanimously adopting resolution 2646 (2022), which expressed deep regret over unilateral actions that run contrary to its previous resolutions and statements on Varosha. Through the text, members called on both sides to respect the integrity of the buffer zone and remove all unauthorized constructions and prevent unauthorized activities along the ceasefire lines.

Azerbaijan

Meetings: 15 September, 20 December.

The Council met twice to discuss the situation in the south Caucasus. On 15 September, members met following the outbreak of clashes along the Armenia-Azerbaijan border on the night of 12 September, which left 105 Armenian servicemen and 71 Azerbaijani soldiers dead. The violence marked the worst outbreak of hostilities between the two ex-Soviet States since 2020, when a dispute over the contested territory of Nagorno-Karabakh sparked a six-week war. Miroslav Jenča, Assistant Secretary-General for Europe, Central Asia and the Americas for the Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs, warned that the escalation served as a stark reminder that tensions between Armenia and Azerbaijan have the potential to destabilize the region. While welcoming the ceasefire agreement reached on 14 September and citing the importance of mediation efforts by the Russian Federation and the European Union, he underscored the urgent need for process of delimitation and demarcation to be advanced. Both countries must abide by their obligation to fully implement the trilateral statement on the 9 November 2020 ceasefire, to enable progress towards a lasting peace treaty, he said.

On 20 December, the Council was again briefed by Assistant Secretary-General Jenča, who noted that, since mid-September, both parties have regularly traded accusations of ceasefire violations. Despite a slew of diplomatic initiatives, including a meeting in Prague in October between Nikol Pashinyan, Prime Minister of Armenia, and Ilham Aliyev, President of Azerbaijan, which resulted in an agreement to deploy the European Union monitoring capacity in Armenia, and an agreement between the leaders on refraining from use or threat of force later that month in Sochi, hosted by Vladimir V. Putin, President of the Russian Federation, tensions had not abated on the border and around areas under the control of Russian Federation peacekeeping forces. Assistant Secretary-General Jenča urged both parties to redouble efforts for a negotiated peaceful settlement before it is too late. In the course of the meeting, representatives of Armenia and Azerbaijan traded charges that the other side had violated the 9 November 2020 trilateral statement and was responsible for military and political provocations, while Council members called on all parties to exercise restraint and abide by agreements reached in four trilateral statements on Nagorno-Karabakh.

Middle East

Syria

Meetings: 5 January, 26 January, 27 January, 27 January, 25 February, 28 February, 10 March, 24 March, 26 April, 29 April, 20 May, 20 June, 27 June, 29 June, 8 July, 12 July, 20 July, 29 August, 14 September, 29 September, 25 October, 25 October, 7 November, 29 November, 5 December, 21 December, 22 December.

Resolutions: 2639, 2642; Not adopted: (S/2022/541); Vetoed: (S/2022/538).

The year began with the Syrian civil war, now in its eleventh year, locking the county into a brutal status quo of violent instability and immiseration. The Council’s capacity to respond and take action was constrained by divergent views on a number of issues, including the delivery of humanitarian aid to the north-west, sanctions and the frequency of meetings held every month on the three tracks, including the political and humanitarian situation in Syria, as well as the use of chemical weapons.

On 5 January, Izumi Nakamitsu, High Representative for Disarmament Affairs, briefed the Council on efforts to implement resolution 2118 (2013), through which the Council first mandated the destruction Syria’s chemical weapons stockpiles and production capabilities. As in previous meetings, she reported that Syria’s declaration of its chemical weapons programme still could not be considered accurate and complete in accordance with the Convention on Chemical Weapons, due to persisting gaps, inconsistencies and unresolved discrepancies. The Syrian Government’s cooperation with the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) Technical Secretariat was essential to close issues that were outstanding since 2014. The Syrian Government needed to allow unfettered access to OPCW personnel, which had been unable, since April 2021, to schedule a twenty-fifth round of consultations with Damascus due to the refusal of an entry visa of one member its Declaration Assessment Team. During the discussion, many Council members deplored Syria’s “obstructive” actions, while the representative of the Russian Federation said the Syrian chemical weapons dossier was politicized and “a pain in everyone’s neck”, adding that he challenged the credibility of information collected by the fact-finding mission in November 2021, pertaining to the use of chemical weapons in 2017.

Geir O. Pedersen, Special Envoy for Syria, briefed the Council on 26 January, following an attempted prison break on 20 January in the north-east town of Al-Hasakah by thousands of detainees with suspected ties to the terrorist group Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), also known as Da’esh. He noted that, although the uprising had been quelled, it sent a clear message on the need to combat the threat of terrorism and to resolve the conflict. Updating the Council on his plan to reconvene the Syrian-led, Syrian-owned, United Nations-facilitated Constitutional Committee, formed in 2019 to spur the peace process, he urged the parties to find some common ground “or at least narrow differences”. Also briefing the Council was Thuraya Hijazi of the organization Release Me in northern Syria, who pointed out that the provision of humanitarian aid, which 5.6 million Syrians required, was frequently politicized. Further, she said the Council had so far failed at finding a political solution to the crisis, leading the Syrian people to lose hope.

The plight of Syrian civilians was the focus on 27 January, during which Martin Griffiths, Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator, told the Council that available funding could only help cover the basic survival needs of half of more than 4 million Syrians in need. “Failure each year cannot be our strategy,” he stressed, voicing concern about the increasing unaffordability of food and the insufficiency of food aid. Further, the six-month plan being devised to reach Syrians in need in the north-west of the country through crossline deliveries could not replace the size or scope of the cross-border operation, which enabled the United Nations, along with its humanitarian partners, to deliver food, vaccines and essential aid to those in need, many of whom live in camps for the internally displaced. Briefing alongside him, Jan Egeland, Secretary General of the Norwegian Refugee Council, also called for the continuation of the United Nations-led cross-border operation to the north-west beyond midsummer when the resolution authorizing it was set to expire. Pointing out that as many as 3 million extremely vulnerable civilians lived in opposition-controlled areas, he called for more effective humanitarian diplomacy, including help from the Russian Federation on the Syrian Government side. Meanwhile, the Russian Federation’s representative said that problems remained to be tackled with the cross-border mechanism and took issue with the impact of sanctions imposed on Syria, stressing: “No amount of humanitarian aid can effectively replace hospitals, power plants, factories and schools that are running smoothly.”

In a second meeting on 27 January, called by the Russian Federation, to discuss the prison break in Al-Hasakah, the Council was updated on the incident by Vladimir Voronkov, Under-Secretary-General of the United Nations Office of Counter-Terrorism, who said it was preventable, as Da’esh had been calling for jail breaks. Emphasizing that military responses were necessary but insufficient to address terrorism, he urged the Council to address dire conditions in detention centres and underlined the need to address the lengthy detention of individuals including children, without charges, including through repatriation to their countries of origin. In the course of the discussion, the Russian Federation’s delegate pressed the United Nations to demand the United States to share a report on the civilian casualties that resulted out of its participation, along with local armed groups, in air strikes carried out in the events that followed the attempted prison raid. The representative of the United States countered such claims, averring that his country was committed to the protection of civilians.

On 25 February, a day after the military invasion of Ukraine by the Russian Federation, Special Envoy Pedersen cautioned the Council that that event would make the international diplomacy needed to spur humanitarian and early recovery efforts more precarious. Nonetheless, he emphasized that, amid the acute suffering and the prevalent political stalemate in Syria, “a political solution is the only way out”. This called for a Syrian-led, Syrian-owned political process, supported by constructive diplomatic efforts, “however hard that is, and especially right now”, he said, outlining arenas for discussion, including a session of the Small Body of the United Nations-facilitated Constitutional Committee slated for March. Briefing alongside him was Assistant Secretary-General Msuya, who pointed out that 12 million Syrians were food insecure, with the rising food prices and flailing economy forcing them to make “unbearable choices”, as borne out by the uptick in child marriages and children being pulled out from school.

High Representative Nakamitsu provided her monthly briefing again on 28 February, reiterating that Syria’s declaration of its chemical weapons programme still could not be considered accurate and complete due to unresolved gaps and inconsistencies. She also updated the Council on planned activities by OPCW, including an in-person meeting between its Director-General, Fernando Arias, and Syria’s Minister for Foreign Affairs and Expatriates, Faisal Mekdad, as well as the next scheduled round of inspections of the Barzah and Jamrayah facilities of the Syrian Scientific Studies and Research Centre in 2022. However, the Russian Federation’s representative called into question the conclusions of the fact-finding mission’s report on alleged use of chemical weapons during the incidents that took place in Douma in 2018. They were “politically motivated” and “technically illiterate”, he said, stressing: “Put simply, it was a sham.” The United States’ delegate countered that assertion, condemning “the disinformation narratives” of his Russian counterpart and asserting that the Assad regime and its allies were trying to impugn OPCW’s integrity as part of a desperate campaign to distract from the human tragedy captured by that body’s reports.

In her monthly briefing on 10 March, High Representative Nakamitsu told the Council: “As has been stressed repeatedly, due to the identified gaps, inconsistencies and discrepancies that remain unresolved at this stage, Syria’s declaration cannot be considered accurate and complete in accordance with the Chemical Weapons Convention.” In the ensuing discussion, the Russian Federation’s representative pointed out that the Council was briefed on the issue a mere 10 days prior, adding that Western colleagues had not listened to the proposal made by China and his country to adjust the timetable to avoid “meeting for the sake of meeting”. The United States’ delegate countered that the Council must continue to receive regular updates on Syria’s chemical weapons file, pointing out that every 1 of the 17 amendments that Syria made to its initial declaration resulted from OPCW expert investigations. Meanwhile, the representative of Syria warned that no progress was going to be made through pressure or ultimatums. Taking issue with the evidence-gathering methods of the fact-finding mission, including its acceptance of samples from “anonymous third parties”, he called for a review of that body’s working methods.

On 24 March, Special Envoy Pedersen updated the Council on the resumption of difficult deliberations by the Small Body of the Syrian Constitutional Committee, tasked with drafting a new Syrian Constitution. Pointing out that the week marked the Syrian conflict’s “grim milestone” of completing 11 years, he appealed to the members of the Committee to “work this week with the sense of seriousness and spirit of compromise that the situation demands”. Briefing alongside him was Hossam Zaki, Assistant Secretary General of the League of Arab States, who highlighted the impact of the conflict on the broader region, particularly refugee-hosting countries such as Lebanon and Jordan, and stressed that support for internally displaced persons and refugees was a shared responsibility.

During another meeting on political developments on 26 April, amid intensifying air strikes and clashes in Syria, Special Envoy Pedersen pointed out that five foreign armies were operating within Syrian territory. In light of the grave humanitarian crisis prevailing in the country, with millions of civilians suffering and being displaced inside and outside its borders, he called for attention and resources to be paid to the country, including through an expansion of cross-line and cross-border assistance. Updating the Council on the limited progress made in narrowing differences during the seventh session of the Constitutional Committee, which concluded on 25 March, he appealed to delegations to prepare for discussions at the Committee’s eighth session, slated for 28 May. Also briefing the Council were Nirvana Shawky, Regional Director for the Middle East and North Africa of CARE International, and Assistant Secretary-General Msuya, who pointed out that, despite the grim humanitarian situation in the country, other conflicts in the world, including the one unfolding in Ukraine, threatened to eclipse the Syrian crisis. “For Syrians living through the twelfth year of this crisis, the future looks bleak,” she said, urging the Council to reauthorize the cross-border operation for at least a year in July, to enable the uninterrupted delivery of life-saving aid to those in need.

High Representative Nakamitsu addressed the Council again on 29 April, voicing regret that there has been little to no change since the previous briefing on issues related to the Syrian chemical-weapons file. She reiterated that the international community cannot have full confidence that Syria’s chemical-weapons programme has been eliminated until outstanding issues are resolved, including pending requested information from Syria and the delayed deployment of the OPCW Declaration Assessment Team due to that country’s continued refusal to issue an entry visa for one of the Team’s experts. In the ensuing debate, several delegates again expressed concern about efforts by Syria – in concert with the Russian Federation – to undermine the work of OPCW, with Ireland’s delegate calling on Damascus to cease its equivocation and cooperate meaningfully with OPCW. Meanwhile, the delegate of the Russian Federation responded that OPCW reports have long been built on a presumption of Syria’s guilt. Adding to that, Syria’s representative emphasized that Syria had fully cooperated with OPCW and fulfilled its obligations under the Chemical Weapons Convention; it only denied a visa to one member of the Declaration Assessment Team due to his lack of objectivity and professionalism.

The paucity of funding for humanitarian needs was the focus again on 20 June, with Under-Secretary-General Griffiths informing Council members that the pledges raised to support Syria during the previous week’s Brussels Conference – nearly $6.7 billion – only represented half the total funding required for 2022. Against this backdrop, he warned that the Council’s failure to renew the authorization for cross-border assistance, set to expire in six weeks, would “disrupt life-saving aid for the people living in north-west Syria, including more than a million children”. Also briefing the Council was Farida Almouslem of the Syrian American Medical Society, who echoed his call on the Council to renew the cross-border resolution, so that doctors and humanitarian workers had the medicine and tools they needed to help patients.

On 29 June, Special Envoy Pedersen returned to brief the Council, underscoring the need for that body to renew the resolution authorizing the delivery of life-sustaining cross-border humanitarian aid into Syria for an additional 12 months, calling it “a kernel of the constructive diplomacy on Syria”, which would support the implementation of his mandate, in building a political settlement. Outlining his engagements with the Syrian-led Syrian-owned Constitutional Committee to implement a political solution, including during that body’s eighth meeting the previous month, despite persisting challenges, he underscored the need for urgent action to support the process. Briefing alongside him was Omar Alshogre, Director for Detainee Affairs at the Syrian Emergency Task Force, who relayed 14 messages from people representing his country’s 14 governorates and who were pleading for help, while noting how powerlessly the Council acted in the face of their enemy. He called on the 15-nation organ to pressure Moscow to open cross-border points that they were holding hostage, including Bab al-Hawa.

Taking up the matter of that border crossing once again on 8 July, the Council rejected two competing resolutions that would have kept it open. The first draft resolution, put forth by Norway and Ireland, which would have effectuated a “6+6-month extension” of the cross-border humanitarian assistance mechanism, was defeated due to the veto cast by the Russian Federation, despite 13 members voting in favour, and one member abstaining (China). The second draft resolution, submitted by the Russian Federation, which would have provided a six‑month extension, was rejected by a vote of 3 against (France, United Kingdom, United States) to 2 in favour (China, Russian Federation), with 10 abstentions. The issue was taken up again on 12 July, with the Council adopting – after protracted negotiations – a compromise text extending the use of the Bab al-Hawa border crossing for six months. Resolution 2642 (2022) was adopted by a vote of 12 in favour to none against, with 3 abstentions (France, United Kingdom, United States), necessitating a separate resolution for a further six-month extension in another six months. A number of delegates voiced concern about the exceptionally contentious negotiation process, with the representative of the United States asserting that the vote was the result of “one member taking the entire Council hostage with lives hanging in the balance”. France’s delegate, noting that the repeated calls by United Nations agencies and its humanitarian partners for a 12-month renewal to ensure uninterrupted aid operations had been ignored, stressed that the Council had failed to live up to its responsibility. For his part, the Russian Federation’s delegate called for an increase in cross-line deliveries, emphasizing that it was time for the United States, United Kingdom and France “to get used to respecting the interests of other States”, notably those impacted by the Council’s decisions.

In her monthly briefing to the Council, on 20 July, High Representative Nakamitsu reported that there had been no progress in clarifying Syria’s declarations pertaining to its chemical weapons programme, with the OPCW Technical Secretariat yet to receive requested declarations from Syria on all undeclared types and quantities of nerve agent produced and/or weaponized, at a former chemical weapons production facility that was declared by Damascus as never having been used to produce and/or weaponize chemical warfare agents. Voicing regret that the twenty-fifth round of consultations in Damascus between the Syrian authorities and the Declaration Assessment Team was still in abeyance, due to Syria’s repeated refusal to issue an entry visa for the Team’s lead technical expert, she urged that country’s Government to cooperate with the Technical Secretariat, adding: “We need to remain vigilant to ensure that these awful weapons are never used again, and are eliminated, not only in Syria, but everywhere.”

On 29 August, Special Envoy Pedersen returned to the Council, reporting that, although relative calm had prevailed for the previous two years and had provided “a window to build a credible political process”, this opportunity had not been seized thus far. “We need to be honest about the mismatch between the scale of our collective political efforts and the scale of the challenge at hand,” he stressed. He also expressed concern about troubling signs of military escalation, pointing out that the international community was prevented from addressing the conflict in a comprehensive manner due to the degree of fragmentation in Syria and the region, even though that was the only way to stave off another dangerous collapse. Noting that plans were on hold for the ninth Syrian Constitutional Committee meeting in Geneva, he called for increased support to enable that body to become credible. Assistant Secretary-General Msuya also briefed the Council, updating members on the violence unfolding in northern Syria, leading to civilian death and displacement, and hampering the United Nations’ ability to operate.

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