Dr Michael Fullilove, Lowy Institute Executive Director, Moderator: Minister, thank you very much for paying us the compliment of giving a very substantive and wide-ranging Gyngell Lecture, and for agreeing to take some questions. And thank you also for the nice things you said about Allan and Frank, and the Institute. I remember the early conversations with Mr Lowy about establishing the Institute, and he was very clear that he wanted to establish it for Australia. It was about furthering Australia’s interests, and we’re very proud of what we’ve achieved. Let me ask five or six questions, and then give the audience an opportunity. Let me start with the region, as you did. Let me ask you about stabilisation with China, this week the institute published a paper by the former Ambassador to China, Graham Fletcher, and he is a big supporter of stabilisation. He made an interesting comment, he said that Beijing has offered Canberra greater cooperation in areas such as AI, but Canberra has batted those away, and Graham said conflicting strategic interests and values will prevent genuine closeness. Do you agree with that? Do you think that because Australia and China are so different, we’ll always be at arm’s length?
Penny Wong, Foreign Minister: I think the formulation – we cooperate where we can, disagree where we must and engage in the national interest – is an attempt in shorthand, to articulate some of the boundaries and considerations that will always be there in terms of the relationship, and there are areas where we can cooperate. There are also areas where, fundamentally, because of who we are, our interests will be different, and by thinking about stabilisation as a way of recognising those fundamental – I suppose structural for want of a different term – differences between our countries, it’s a way of saying, let’s recognise we’re going to have these differences. We also have areas we can cooperate, and it is absolutely in both countries’ interest to continue to engage. I think probably what Graham has said is a different way of saying the same thing. We’re a democracy. We have a view about the world, about universal principles. That is part of who we are and part of our interests. And fundamentally, there will be some things where we know we will continue to disagree, so the wisdom has to come from how do you navigate a relationship, recognising some things won’t change, but where are the areas where you can engage more closely?
Fullilove: All right, you mentioned the treaty alliances and other agreements in the Pacific that you and your officials have developed in the last four years –
Foreign Minister: And Southeast Asia.
Fullilove: Yes, and I think that constitutes one of the Government’s signature achievements. Is this all part of what you’ve called, in a different context, our permanent competition with China in the Pacific? And do you think that these agreements will limit Beijing’s influence in the region?
Foreign Minister: Let’s answer in the broad and then in the specific. I think in the broad, one of the things that I thought before I became foreign minister and I wrote about was that we had to rethink how we would do foreign policy given the circumstances, and I think probably I underestimated how different the circumstances would be – and I’m not suggesting that the very storied individuals in the room who have made such a contribution to our country haven’t had to deal with difference. But I do think that where we are now, we will never go back to what we knew for many decades, and so thinking through that, what does that mean for Australia? How do we approach that differently? And I tried to articulate in the speech and in much of what I’ve said, which is, you know, how do you make sure you have multiple strategies around assuring Australia’s interests and building Australia’s security, and one of them is trying to build different architecture for the relationships in our region, Pacific and Southeast Asia, particularly. That is not the only thing you have to do, and one of the points that you know is that I emphasise with people is we always have to make those agreements substantive and real in the practice of how our relationships are built, and certainly we bring that to how we try to construct these agreements but also how we engage. You’re right. I have described it as permanent contest in the Pacific, and I think that’s self-evident. The reason I use that phrase was to try and explain or communicate that this is ongoing. There’s no set and forget, if there ever were, but there certainly is not now.
Fullilove: All right, let me ask you about the United States. You mentioned AUKUS in your speech, and I note the PM also discussed it overnight with President Trump. AUKUS was one element of Australian foreign policy or Australian government policy, of which Allan Gyngell disapproved
Foreign Minister: Yes, we didn’t agree on that one.
Fullilove: Yes, well, let me put his criticism to you. He argued that that AUKUS neglected persuasion. He thought it would impede our cooperation with Asian states, and that it took us back into the Anglosphere. How do you address those kinds of criticisms?
Foreign Minister: I think fundamentally we had a capability issue we had to address, which is we had a submarine capability which needed to be replaced. So, there’s a sort of fundamental pragmatic point about that, and I am one that thinks deterrence is an essential part of assuring the peace. So, there’s that point, but I think what I would say is I recognised how that could be and was being seen, and in fact that first year we spent a lot of time engaging with the countries of the region, briefing them, taking them through it, and as I said, this is an existing capability we are seeking to replace. But I went to intent. I said first, we are prepared to be very transparent, and I appreciated. I don’t think Angus had to do it, but I did ask the previous CDF to go and brief in great detail many countries in Southeast Asia at both military and political level, but I talked about what our intent was. I said Australia never seeks to disrupt. You know, our objective in attaining this capability is deterrence in order to assure the peace, and it is alongside all the things you see us doing that contribute to stability in our engagement, our diplomatic engagement, and in our economic engagement, and I think you know, a couple of years in, the perception around it. Richard did a lot of work with me, and we did a lot of work in the Pacific as well, because I think actually sharing our perspective and being quite transparent about intent was quite helpful.
Fullilove: Tell me a bit more about your experiences of the Trump Administration. You were there for President Trump’s second inauguration. You’ve had what appear to be quite warm encounters with the Secretary of State Marco Rubio. What are your observations? What were your observations of the inauguration. What’s been your experience with Secretary Rubio?
Foreign Minister: I said quite early, President Trump envisages a very different role for the United States in the world, and I said that when I was Shadow Foreign as well, and you only had to look at what he’d said. So, I wasn’t in the sort of camp of it’ll be different when they come to government. I thought this will be a very different America, and he’s been very upfront about that. But as I said in the speech, the U.S. remains so critical to us and to the world. Secretary Rubio is extremely good to work with. One, his view is, I don’t want to speak for him, but I think you can see from what he has said he understands the place of the Indo-Pacific in the reshaping of the global order, and why it’s so central, and he understands the importance of working with others to assure a balance of power. In fact, I think also Elbridge Colby spoke about it yesterday, overnight. So, he is very good to work with. We’ve had quite a lot to do with each other because of multiple Quad meetings, and he has seen the Quad as one of the ways in which U.S. foreign and strategic policy is operationalised. So, he’s leant into that quite a lot, which is a good thing.
Fullilove: Speaking of Mr Colby and middle powers, Mark Carney, the Canadian Prime Minister, spoke on this stage actually in March, and he made a similar argument to the argument he made at Davos, which is that middle powers should work with each other much more intensively. You will have seen that Elbridge Colby has chimed in on this topic, and in Manila this week he rejected what he called the delusion of fashionable and superficial ideas like middle power alliances designed to exclude America, and that followed on a tweet thread that he put out a couple of months ago, where he said that we in the Trump Administration view the international scene through the prism of interest, geography, economics, and military power. Middle powers don’t have a coherent basis for alignment. So, who’s right? Do you think, Carney or Colby?
Foreign Minister: Well, speaking of binaries! Mine is neither of their arguments. The reason I’d set out the architecture or the sort of framework of how we think about it is because it is important to recognise the importance of the U.S. alliance, but not exclusively rely on that relationship for every aspect of your interests, and you know we are, and I would not have thought that was what Mr Colby would want either. In fact, I read his remarks, and I read the articles that they are based on, and I was interested how much he talked about balance of power. He talks about partners and the U.S. role in providing a balance of power in the region, and his responses on that actually are, I think, very similar to how we think about it. So, I think you have to be active in your relationship with your principal strategic partner, which is the United States. But you also have to be active in your region and with other partners.
Fullilove: One point that Mr Carney made when he spoke to us in March was about how great powers increasingly weaponise economic integration, and let me ask you about that in our region, because as you know, since last November, when the Japanese Prime Minister made some comments about Taiwan, Beijing has led a pressure campaign against Japan, including by limiting rare earth and technology exports, and of course we in Australia know what this sort of coercive campaign feels like. Let me invite you to make some comments on that.
Foreign Minister: We are against economic coercion of any type in any context, and I think it is very clear that economic power is being used for strategic ends much more, and the response to it has to be there is no simple response to it, but one of them is you know make sure you diversify, you are economically resilient, so you have as diversified a set of economic options as you can, and the other is to continue to advocate for, including with others, what your interests are. We believe in open, predictable trading arrangements, which we believe is the basis both of stability and prosperity. But we’re not so naive to understand that that is not how the world, parts of the world, some powers in the world are changing how that has operated, how they are operating in that system, and so you have to think through where is it we need to build our own economic resilience so we are less vulnerable to any form of the wielding of that economic power.
Fullilove: You spoke a lot about rules and multilateral institutions today, but I notice you didn’t dwell on the United Nations. And the truth is that these days most people don’t dwell on the subject of the United Nations. And we were thinking the other day that when we established the Institute in 2002, the United Nations was really at or near the centre of geopolitics, and you remember the Iraq War and all the discussion about whether the Americans would have to go back to the Security Council, and you remember that Kofi Annan was a really quite a significant player in international politics at that time. These days, whether it’s on Ukraine or Iran, very few people seem to be looking to New York. Very few world leaders, I would suggest, wake up and think, what does Antonio Guterres think about this topic. Why do you think the United Nations has lost so much altitude in the last 25 years? And is there, when you look ahead at the candidates for Secretary-General, is there one who you think could give it a boost?
Foreign Minister: I think if I can start though with the comparison between the Iraq War and Ukraine. I mean, I think for many, in many ways, the fact that the Security Council could not deal with Russia’s invasion of Ukraine was emblematic of the constraints that currently exist, that within which the UN Security Council is operating. And I don’t think when humanity came together to draw up the charter, they went, oh what if a P5 uses its veto to enable a breach of the charter? People are not looking to it because it has not been able to resolve some of the major conflicts of our time. But on the other hand, we did the Declaration on the Protection of Humanitarian Personnel, and we did it on the lawns of the UN. Luckily, it didn’t rain, and we’re now at 122 countries. I can’t recall how many signatories we got that day, but at the event we had people from all over the world and we had foreign minister after foreign minister from all different continents, the different cultural backgrounds, different languages, all speaking about the Geneva Conventions, and it actually made me feel more hopeful than I had for some time, and I’m known as quite a pessimist. But I thought actually, there’s still many countries that see the benefit of collective rule-based behaviour, and it often doesn’t win out, and it often you know, it’s flawed. But there is still the desire amongst many states. Actually, we do want to try and work out how we work together, work our way through this. So, I think I spoke in the speech about we have to hold on to the parts that we really care about, and I think there is that. You know, the UN in 2030, 2040, I don’t think it will be the same as the UN of 20 years ago. But I think we still need an international system where the nations, the world, can try and mediate difference and conflict through rules where we can, and that does require a lot of work.
Fullilove: And you were going to say who we’re going to back in for Secretary?
Foreign Minister: I don’t think I was going to say that.
Fullilove: There are no Australian candidates at this point, are there?
Foreign Minister: I think the Latin American groups, to be honest, I haven’t really engaged.
Fullilove: My last question is this. You finished your speech by talking at length about multiculturalism and immigration, and that’s dominated this morning’s coverage of your remarks. The other element of that issue is social cohesion, and of course, we’re in the middle of an important Royal Commission on that topic. Can you talk a bit about the importance of social cohesion?
Foreign Minister: Well, I think I spoke about it really in a different way in the speech where I talked about respect for a love for one another. That you know, to be able to respect each other and treat each other, value each other, regardless of who you are or when you came to this country, it’s been one of our country’s greatest strengths, and we’re going through, we’ve been through a very difficult time, and we are still going through a very difficult time. It is something all of us contribute to. I hope the Royal Commission will give us some more insights, that something positive can arise out of what has been such a tragic event. But I hope that in part we remember that all of us have a role in building that social cohesion, and yes, we live in a time where social media and the fomenting of anger and division is the kind of way so much is dealt with. We just have to keep pushing back against that, because ultimately, I do think it makes us weaker. It’s potentially destructive internally, but it makes us weaker in the world.
Fullilove: All right, thank you for that. We’re going to take two or three questions from the audience, and I see my colleague Oli Nobetau. If you could stand up, Oli, and introduce yourself, and then ask the minister a question.
Audience question: Thank you, Michael, and thank you, Minister, for that very insightful lecture. My name is Oliver Nobetau. I’m the director of the Pacific Islands Program at the Lowy Institute. As you reflected, Allan Gyngell used to say that foreign policy is about expanding our choices, but a good deal of Australia’s Pacific diplomacy is designed to narrow its neighbours’ choices, specifically their choice for security arrangements with China. Now, in doing so, are we asking the region to accept something less than what we claim for ourselves? Thank you.
Foreign Minister: I’m sorry, I just don’t agree. No, I really don’t. And let me explain. I know that is something I’ve heard some people say. But first, the Pacific Island Forum leaders have made clear, I think, on three occasions now, so Boe Declaration, Biketawa, and Ocean of Peace, that part of stability is ensuring that security is provided from within the Pacific family, and so when we are working to help ensure that that occurs, I don’t think that is us seeking to constrain choices. It’s actually supporting what is a regional decision, and I have a very strong view. And I know you’ve had Prime Minister Rabuka and Prime Minister Fiame, I think, speak here, or at Lowy, and regionalism is one of the ways in which the asymmetry of power between smaller powers and great powers, larger powers, can be resolved. The second thing I’d make the point is that in terms of security, one of the ways in which we should approach it is also to build the capacity of countries of the Pacific, so the Pacific Policing Initiative I always describe as Pacific-led, Australian-backed. We’re actually training Pacific Island police officers here in Australia, so that they can go back to provide that domestic security with greater capability in their own countries, I think that is building capacity and building independence and sovereignty. I think the final point is, and I’d encourage you to look at – I’m sure you, because you know you’re at Lowy, you guys are really smart – but I’m sure the Vuvale Union, if you look at the economic people-to-people treaty with Fiji as opposed to the security treaty. I mean, it is really clear about all of the domains in which Fiji wants us to work with them, which brings me to my final point. We seek to be led by Pacific priorities in those discussions, and sometimes they change. Sometimes, in different countries, we’ll have different priorities. Different governments of those countries have different priorities. But the throughline that we try to bring to those negotiations and to policy flowing out of it is to be led by the priorities of the country with whom we’re working. We have to give Darren a question.
Fullilove: Yes, all right. We’ll give Darren a question. Yes, Darren Lim.
Audience question: Thank you, Minister. Allan believed in persuasion. Yeah, we’re a friendly audience, and we all support the vision you set out. I’m wondering when you present this vision out to the region, into Southeast Asia, into the Pacific, where you don’t get full agreement. What is our persuasion agenda? What more work is there to do to persuade our neighbours for the vision that we have for the region and for the world.
Foreign Minister: I’m trying to think about where I’ve had a kind of really strong pushback in the region. I think that the Southeast Asian countries and the Pacific countries understand the circumstances that they face, and they are seeking to work through how do we deal with a world in which the great powers are paying a lot more attention to us, and our region is much more contested, and they are seeking to do what we are seeking to do, which is how do we maximise our choices and our options. And so, they may not take the same approach, but I don’t often get an analytical difference. And I’m sure you could find things where we may not have persuaded people as much, and not everyone has the same strategic kind of view about what to do, same view about what to do about the strategic circumstances. But what I try to do, and I think certainly Jan and the department seek to do, is to understand where people are coming from, and I don’t just mean what’s their cultural background or their language. It’s actually how do they see the world? How do they understand what their country is looking at and experiencing? And what are they? How do they perceive their national interests? And how do they want to deal with it? And then where can we align with that. Where can we build alignment with that? So even if we don’t agree on everything, let’s do this bit. Does that make sense?
Fullilove: We’ll take two final questions. I’m going to take the lady at the back who was first with the hand up. No, no, that’s okay, and we can fit everybody in. We’re going to take two questions at once, if we can, and then Shruti Pandalai, our new India chair. So over to you, Madam.
Audience question: Thank you, Michael, and thank you, Senator. My name is Rurika Imahashi, I’m with Nikkei. Russian President Putin visited the northern territories, which are claimed by both Japan and Russia for the first time yesterday. While Russia and China continue to expand their joint military patrols in the Indo-Pacific, how do you see the Russia-China partnership evolving, and what implication could it have for our regional security? Thank you.
Foreign Minister: They themselves have described it as a no-limit partnership, I think there’s no doubt that Russia is disruptive, apart from the invasion of Ukraine, it is disruptive in terms of the world. So, we have a different view about Russia and engaging with them to China, China knows that.
Fullilove: Just on that, Minister, do you worry about the tightening of connections between China and Russia and Iran and North Korea?
Foreign Minister: Yes, of course. I mean, I thought that the deployment of North Korean troops to Ukraine – that that the two regional conflicts being connected in a really open way – was pretty deeply problematic, and I think we understand we have a view, along with many others, about strategic balance in the region and the importance of the rules-based system, and that is being challenged in many ways, and this is one of them.
Fullilove: Okay. Last question to Shruti.
Audience question: Thank you, Senator Wong, for your thoughtful remarks. I’m Shruti Pandalai, the inaugural India Chair at Lowy Institute. I was wondering, you spent a considerable amount of time in your remarks talking about Australia trying to maximise its choices. This rings very close to how India practices its ideas in multi-alignment and strategic autonomy, but as governments around the world sort of refine the idea of how they look at economic security, India perhaps looks at it as a fundamental anchor to national sovereignty questions. I was wondering how you think about the Australian approach to economic security.
Foreign Minister: When I use the phrase resilience, what I was trying to bring in, and what I have been trying to bring in, is both what you would describe as economic security, as well as the strength of our democracy and institutions against external influence, and the strength of our social cohesion, which Michael referred to, How I try to think about it is here are all the ways in which our society, the nation state, can be weakened, made more vulnerable. So, what do we have to do to make that less likely? And so it’s not a single domain, is it? Because it is economic security. That’s one, and making sure you can manage a state applying a coercive economic position to you or a trade impediment to you. But it is also about making sure your democracy and your polity is robust and able to consider and make the decisions and operationalise the decisions that you want. So that’s what I was trying to pick up in the term resilience as a bit of an umbrella term.
Fullilove: Ladies and gentlemen, we’re out of time. Thank you again for joining us for this second lecture in honour of Allan Gyngell.
