The Director-General (DG) of the World Health Organization (WHO) is hereby transmitting the report of the second meeting of the International Health Regulations (2005) ( IHR ) Emergency Committee (Committee) regarding the epidemic of Ebola disease caused by Bundibugyo virus (BVD) in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), held on Tuesday, 18 August 2026, from 12:00 to 17:00 CEST.
The DG welcomes the Statement by the Committee, presented at the beginning of its report, and expresses his most sincere gratitude to the Chair, Members, and Advisors of the Committee.
Concurring with the advice expressed by the Committee during the meeting, the DG determined that the BVD epidemic in the DRC continues to meet the criteria of a public health emergency of international concern (PHEIC), but not those of a pandemic emergency. Accordingly, on 24 August 2026, the DG, considering the advice offered by the Committee, issued temporary recommendations to States Parties, available here .
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Statement by Committee
The Committee commends the Government of Uganda for the rapid control of BVD transmission, with no new cases detected since 16 July 2026, and recognizes the major efforts being undertaken by the DRC, affected communities, WHO and national and international partners. Nevertheless, the Committee considers the continuing rapid growth and geographic expansion of the epidemic in the DRC to be of grave concern, requiring urgent, intensified and sustained action.
As of 18 August 2026, approximately 5,000 BVD cases have been reported in the DRC. Available modelling suggests that substantial under-ascertainment may be occurring, with the true number of infections potentially three- to four-fold higher. Without a rapid change in the trajectory of transmission, the epidemic risks reaching a scale with profound national and regional consequences, with the potential for case numbers and deaths to exceed those seen in the 2013-2016 Ebola disease epidemic in West Africa. The Committee therefore emphasizes the need for urgent, decisive and coordinated action to control BVD transmission in the DRC.
The BVD epidemic is occurring in the context of an already severe and complex humanitarian emergency. Areas with some of the highest BVD transmission burdens substantially overlap with areas affected by armed conflict, insecurity, population displacement and constrained humanitarian access.
These conditions endanger affected populations and responders, impede community engagement, surveillance, contact tracing, safe and timely access to care, infection prevention and control (IPC), and other essential response operations.
At the same time, disruption of essential health services risks increasing preventable deaths from malaria, diarrhoeal diseases, maternal causes and other conditions. Uncontrolled transmission also carries potentially serious consequences for neighbouring countries and for the social and economic stability of the Great Lakes region.
The Committee emphasizes that communities must be at the center of the response. Erosion of trust in authorities and responders, insufficient community ownership, insecurity and operational and coordination weaknesses are major impediments to effective control. These challenges cannot be addressed through public health interventions alone. The response must be built with affected communities and supported by trusted local leaders and organizations, with transparent communication, meaningful participation and mechanisms through which community concerns rapidly influence response operations.
The Committee notes that current epidemiological, clinical and genomic evidence does not indicate a fundamental change in the known biology, modes of transmission or clinical characteristics of Bundibugyo virus (BDBV). The priority, therefore, is to deliver science-based public health response interventions of proven effectiveness at sufficient speed, quality, coverage and scale.
The Committee is deeply concerned that implementation of core essential public health response interventions has not yet consistently achieved the coverage and performance required to interrupt BVD transmission. An immediate and drastic operational intensification and scale-up of response operations is required, potentially with an operational reset. Particular priority needs to be given to ensuring community engagement and community-based surveillance; rapid case detection, investigation and isolation; comprehensive contact identification and follow-up; IPC in BVD isolation and treatment centers, other health-care facilities and communities; safe and dignified management of deaths; timely laboratory diagnosis; and accessible, high-quality clinical care. All these areas require intensification of efforts, and all should be viewed as essential components of an effective response. While none of these areas can afford to be neglected or deprioritized, the Committee identifies below specific areas requiring urgent action and particular focus.
Effective vaccines and therapeutics against BVD, should they become available and be demonstrated to be safe and effective through rigorous clinical trials, could make an important contribution to reducing transmission, morbidity and mortality; however, they should complement rather than be a substitute for rigorous implementation of core public health measures.
The response must be planned not only for the immediate term but for the sustained engagement that will be required over the coming months, or even years. This requires predictable financing, adequate human resources, secure access to communities, resilient supply chains, continuity of essential health services, and sustained national, regional and international political commitment.
The Committee therefore calls for an immediate, unified and fully resourced intensification of the response, under the leadership of the Government of the DRC and with sustained regional and international support. The temporary recommendations issued by the DG should be translated into one integrated, time-bound and costed national action plan for the DRC, serving as the common framework for aligning the efforts and resources of the Government and national and international partners.
The plan should establish clear responsibilities, measurable milestones and indicators; identify operational and geographic gaps; quantify the human, logistical and financial resources required; and include a companion gap analysis to guide urgent resource mobilization. Implementation should be reviewed frequently against agreed indicators and the evolving epidemiological situation, with rapid corrective action where milestones are not being achieved.
Given the intersection between ongoing transmission, armed conflict, insecurity and restricted humanitarian access, the Committee emphasizes that high-level political engagement is urgently required to secure safe, sustained and unhindered access for epidemic-control operations that is being called for. National, regional and international leaders should use all appropriate diplomatic and humanitarian channels to create the conditions necessary for effective implementation of comprehensive response measures. Where required, this should include arrangements for temporary cessations of hostilities or other humanitarian access measures that enable affected communities to receive essential health services and allow response teams to operate safely and effectively.
The imperative is clear: interrupt BVD transmission rapidly, protect affected communities and health workers, maintain essential health services, prevent further geographic and cross-border spread, and mobilize the political, operational and financial support necessary to bring the epidemic under control.
The Committee calls for particular focus on the following urgent priority interventions:
- Drastic scale-up of trust-building and community engagement through trusted communication channels and local actors, including local leaders, religious leaders, traditional healers and survivors, to support community participation in fostering the acceptance of public health measures, including early detection, case referral, contact tracing, safe and dignified burial practices, and adoption of protective behaviours.
- Drastic scale-up of IPC measures to prevent transmission in BVD isolation and treatment centers, other healthcare settings, and, in some circumstances, at home in the community. With regard to the latter, although it is not realistic to expect community members to be able to maintain the same level of application of IPC measures as in healthcare settings, it must be recognized that, for myriad reasons, many sick persons cannot or will not seek care in health care facilities. Until clinical care capacity can be augmented, along with the requisite enhanced security and community trust to motivate and permit sick persons to seek care, steps to limit transmission in the home, such as distribution of personal protective equipment, materials and disinfectants, may reduce transmission risk and morbidity, and may also represent a conduit for greater community engagement.
- Drastic scale-up of BVD isolation and treatment centers staffed by a specifically trained workforce, with appropriate provision of personal protective equipment and materials.
In-depth analysis or research to identify and characterize BVD transmission dynamics associated with specific settings, including related modes of BVD transmission (e.g. caretaking in the home, hospital, or at traditional healers, re-use of needles). A better understanding of the epidemiology of the epidemic is essential for the implementation of effective interventions.
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The Annex to this Report records the views of one Member of the Committee in relation to the “Statement by the Committee”.
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Proceedings of the meeting
All 12 Members of, and five Advisors to, the Committee participated in the meeting convened by teleconference, via Zoom, on Tuesday, 18 August 2026, from 12:00 to 17:00 CEST.
